Denial and Deception: Iraq’s Aluminum Tubes and the Case for War

Introduction

One of the principal claims propagated by government officials in making the case for war against Iraq was the threat of Saddam Hussein acquiring a nuclear weapon. The image of a "mushroom cloud" was repeatedly invoked by officials, frightening Americans who didn't know any better into thinking that Saddam was either on the verge of developing a nuke or, worse, that he already had the bomb, and, furthermore, that he was capable, ready and willing to use it against the United States.

In support of this claim, Bush administration officials cited Iraq's attempted purchase of thousands of aluminum tubes which, they claimed, were intended for use in centrifuges required to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon. This was the key piece of "evidence" cited by the government in support of their assertions about Iraq's nuclear intentions.

The government has now been publicly acknowledged what was well known months prior to the invasion of Iraq: that the tubes were not intended for use in a nuclear program, but were intended for a conventional rocket program. The CIA's Iraq Survey Group (ISG), for example, finally admitted in its final report that "Iraqi interest in aluminum tubes appears to have come from efforts to produce 81-mm rockets, rather than a nuclear end use."[1]

In order to explain why the administration's claims about Iraq were demonstrated to have been so entirely erroneous, the notion of a widespread "intelligence failure" has been propagated. This theory is built upon the assumption that it is only with hindsight that we can know that claims made by the Bush administration were false. This, however, is incorrect, an apparent attempt to revise the history of the events that led up to the war.

A simple analysis comparing the administration's claims about Iraq with the facts known at the time reveals serious flaws in the "intelligence failure" hypothesis. Such an analysis reveals that not only was there was no credible evidence supporting the administrations claims, but there was enough information available publicly to easily demonstrate well before the invasion commenced that this was so. A simple examination of the facts reveals that the claims made by the Bush administration varied from deceptive and misleading to outright fabrications and lies. What follows is an extensive chronological review of what information was known and when and by whom it was known.

The Dispute Within the Intelligence Community

The issue of the aluminum tubes did not become public until September, 2002, but it was a matter that had been hotly debated within the intelligence community before it began to be debated publicly. A review of the internal dispute is important to understand the context before examining the Bush administration's public claims about the tubes. Much of this information has been declassified through the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, which will be drawn upon extensively in this section.

The first CIA assessment of the aluminum tubes was published on April 10, 2001. It stated that the tubes "have little use other than for a uranium enrichment program." No explanation for how this conclusion was arrived at was provided. However, the report did acknowledge that "using aluminum tubes in a centrifuge effort would be inefficient and a step backward from the specialty steel machines Iraq was poised to mass produce at the onset of the Gulf War."

The next day, the Department of Energy published their own analysis, providing a far more detailed explanation of their conclusions:

Based on the reported specifications, the tubes could be used to manufacture gas centrifuge rotor cylinders for uranium enrichment. However, our analysis indicates that the specified tube diameter, which is half that of the centrifuge machine Iraq successfully tested in 1990, is only marginally large enough for practical centrifuge applications, and other specifications are not consistent with a gas centrifuge end use. Moreover, the quantity being sought suggests preparations for large scale production of centrifuge machines, for which we have not seen related procurement efforts - and the tubes' specifications suggest a centrifuge design quite different from any Iraq is known to have. Thus, we assess that this procurement activity more likely supports a different application…. While the gas centrifuge application cannot be ruled out, we assess that the procurement activity more likely supports a different application, such as conventional ordnance production. For example, the tube specifications and quantity appear to be generally consistent with their use as launch tubes for man-held anti-armor rockets or as tactical rocket casings. Also, the manner in which the procurement is being handled (multiple procurement agents, quotes obtained from multiple suppliers in diverse locations, and price haggling) seems to better match our expectations for a conventional Iraqi military buy than a major purchase for a clandestine weapons-of-mass destruction program.

The DOE, after further research, published another report on May 9 that explained another possible use for the tubes, noting that "Iraq has purchased similar aluminum tubes previously to manufacture chambers (tubes) for a multiple rocket launcher."

The CIA responded on June 14 with a report that claimed the tubes "are suitable for uranium enrichment gas centrifuge rotors and, while less likely, could be used as rocket bodies for multiple rocket launchers." Once again, the CIA, unlike the DOE, failed to explain the rationale for their argument.[2]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) first became alerted to the tubes issue in the summer of 2001. The IAEA immediately recognized that Iraq had previously used tubes with identical dimensions in a conventional rocket program. There was extensive documentation about the procurement of those tubes.

A CIA analyst from the Center for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control (WINPAC) known simply as "Joe" was largely responsible for creating and propagating the argument that the tubes were intended for a centrifuge program. In July, he traveled to Vienna in order to convince IAEA experts of his position. He argued that after cutting the tubes and machining down the thickness, they could be used in a centrifuge, suggesting that they would then have the same mass as rotors in a Zippe centrifuge design. The IAEA experts pointed out a number of flaws in his analysis, such as that he had failed to calculate the mass of end caps and other components of such a design.[3]

Another report was issued on July 2 that claimed, "The tubes are constructed from high strength aluminum (7075-T6) and are manufactured to the tight tolerances necessary for gas centrifuges. The dimensions of the tubes match those of a publicly available gas centrifuge design from the 1950s, known as the Zippe centrifuge." The report concluded that "the specifications for the tubes far exceed any known conventional weapons application, including rocket motor casings for 81-mm multiple rocket launchers."

Nine additional intelligence reports were produced in the next year discussing Iraq's aluminum tubes. According to the Senate Committee report, "None of these assessments provided any additional information to support the CIA's analysis…" Furthermore, "Most of the assessments were disseminated in limited channels, only to high-level policymakers and were not available to intelligence analysts from other agencies." When asked by the Senate Committee why this was so, the CIA replied that they were written as responses to specific questions and intended for the President.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) produced a report on August 2, 2001 that embraced the CIA assessment, saying "DIA analysts found the CIA WINPAC presentation to be very compelling." This was apparently based on acceptance of the CIA's false claim that the tubes were a "match" to those used in the Zippe centrifuge.

On August 17, the DOE released an extensive analysis of the tubes, once again noting that Iraq had previously used tubes with "the same specifications" to manufacture rockets. The tubes, DOE argued, were not well suited for a centrifuge and the aluminum used "provides performance roughly half that of the materials Iraq previously pursued." In other words, Iraq, if it were indeed intending these tubes for use in a centrifuge, would be taking a step backwards, as the CIA had already acknowledged. Furthermore, the diameter of the tubes was smaller than any known centrifuge and "too thick for favorable use as rotor tubes, exceeding the nominal 1-mm thickness of known aluminum rotor tubes by more than a factor of three." In other words, as the Senate Committee later noted, "The dimensions of the tubes seized do not 'match' the dimensions of any of Zippe's centrifuge designs." Moreover, according to the DOE, the anodized surface "is not consistent with a gas centrifuge application." While possible, a gas centrifuge application was "unlikely" and "a rocket production application is the more likely end use for these tubes."

In November, another DIA assessment was published, arguing that "Although alternative uses for the tubes are possible, such as rocket motor cases or rocket launch tubes, the specifications are consistent with earlier Iraqi gas centrifuge rotor designs." But as the DOE had pointed out, and as the CIA had conceded early on, using aluminum tubes was not "consistent with earlier Iraqi gas centrifuge rotor designs" but an "inefficient step backward". The DIA nonetheless claimed that the tubes would make "poor choices for rocket motor bodies." Apparently, no explanation was given for why they believed this was so, while the DOE, on the other hand, in arguing their case, had pointed out that Iraq had already used similar tubes in a known rocket program.

The DOE noted once again in December that "The wall thickness [of the tubes] is three times greater than that for metal rotor designs used in high-speed centrifuges", including the Zippe design. Their assessment also pointed out the inefficiency of any centrifuge built using the tubes Iraq had attempted to acquire, and estimated that Iraq would need 12,000-16,000 centrifuges to produce enough highly enriched uranium for one weapon per year (25 kg). "In short," the DOE reported, "we judge it unlikely that anyone could deploy an enrichment facility capable of producing weapons significant quantities of HEU based on these tubes." One analyst later expressed that it was his view that if Iraq truly intended these tubes for use in a centrifuge, then "we should just give them the tubes."

On August 1, 2002 the CIA published its first assessment explaining its rationale for its claims about the tubes. Among the reasons the CIA believed the tubes were intended for a centrifuge program what it claimed were high tolerances, high cost, and secrecy in procurement.

The next month the DIA acknowledged that "Alternative uses for the tubes, such as rocket motor cases or launch tubes, are possible." But their assessment once again asserted that "this is less likely because the specifications are consistent with late-1980s Iraqi gas centrifuge rotor designs."

The CIA also published another assessment in September, repeating as evidence for an intended centrifuge application the claims of Iraqi secrecy in procurement, high coast, tight tolerances, the anodized coating, and that the tubes "matched" known centrifuge specifications. It also concluded that in was unlikely the tubes were intended for a rocket program. Apparently, no rationale for why this was considered "unlikely" was given as the agency continued to ignore the analyses of the nation's top experts at the DOE, as well as the IAEA.[4]